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Abstract
Hedge has been proposed as an adaptive scheme, which guides an
agent’s decision in resource selection and distribution problems that can
be modeled as a multi-armed bandit full information game. Such problems
are encountered in the areas of computer and communication networks,
e.g. network path selection, load distribution, network interdiction, and
also in problems in the area of transportation. We study Hedge under the
assumption that the total loss that can be suffered by the player in each
round is upper bounded. In this paper, we study the worst performance
of Hedge.
Keywords: Hedge algorithm, multiplicative updates algorithm, multi-
armed bandit, network interdiction, worst performance.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The game model
Firstly we summarize the generalized full information multi-armed bandit game:
A machine offers N betting options (or “arms”). In each round the player bets
an amount of money M by assigning a fraction pi (
∑N
i=1 pi = 1) of M to option
i. The machine responds by determining a penalty (or reward) factor `i for each
option i; effectively the player’s result in the current round is equal to
R =
N∑
i=1
piM × `i = M
N∑
i=1
pi × `i (1)
The game is played for a pre-determined total number of T rounds. The player
aims at minimizing the total loss or maximizing the total reward over the whole
game.
This game is known as the full information version of the multi-armed bandit
game [Rob85] since the full penalty vector (`1, `2, . . . , `N ) is announced to the
player after each round, the other option being to announce only the outcome
R. Also, the game is called generalized in the sense that the player is allowed to
play mixed strategies, i.e. to distribute the total bet to different options in the
same round.
An ordinary assumption is that the bet per round M remains constant; in
the following, we shall set M = 1 without loss of generality. However, a less
ordinary assumption that we use in this paper is that the loss that can be inflicted
on the player in each round is upper bounded. We express this restriction by
upper-bounding the sum of penalties. Again, if we normalize the penalties w.r.t.
to the upper bound, we can write
N∑
i=1
`i ≤ 1 (2)
In other words the machine works within a limited penalty budget in each round.
Effectively the normalization assumption
∑
i pi = 1 together with (2) imply that∑N
i=1 `ipi ≤ maxi{`i} ≤ 1, thereby restricting the maximum loss per round to
one unit. The `is can become rewards by assigning them negative and restricting
their sum to be greater than -1. In this paper we use losses.
1.2 A fair game interpretation
The loss based game seems unfair, since the player always suffers losses, but it
can easily be converted to a fair game: Suppose that in each round the player
is awarded with an amount equal to 1/N , therefore the gain of the player in a
single round is
g =
1
N
−
N∑
i=1
pi × `i.
Then the player could choose p1 = p2 = . . . = pN = 1/N , which implies
g = 0. Effectively, if the player insists on bet equipartition, no positive gains
can be achieved either. If the player can predict the option with the minimum
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loss that will appear in the next round, say option i0, the gain will become
g = 1/N − `i0 > 0 (since mini `i <
∑
i `i = 1/N) by choosing pi0 = 1. For an
arbitrary bet distribution vector (p1, . . . , pN ) the gain g can be either positive or
negative. The worst possible gain outcome is g = 1/N −maxi `i, and will appear
if the player is extremely unlucky, so as to bet exclusively on the worst option.
It can also be shown that a uniformly random selection of weights pi and
losses `i will produce an average loss equal to 1/N , thus a neutral outcome of the
gain. Any successful prediction can tilt the balance of the game in favor of the
player. A well known fact in the literature is that if the arms of the bandit behave
according to stationary processes, the Hedge algorithm (see Section 1.3) brings
the per round gain asymptotically to the optimum, i.e. towards 1/N−miniE{`i}.
Effectively, Hedge will take advantage of any difference in the statistical behavior
of the arms, and due to 2 it will produce positive gains.
However, in this paper we explore the performance of Hedge when there is no
stationarity or other assumption that restricts the multi-armed bandit behavior.
In fact, we determine the behavior of the bandit that results into the worst
possible outcome of the player, when the player has adopted Hedge as a decision
making aid.
1.3 The player’s hand and Hedge algorithm
The player aims at minimizing the total loss over the whole game; this aim can
only be achieved by suitably controlling the bet distribution pi in each round.
Clearly, if the player could predict the result of the current round, she would
choose the option with the minimum loss and bet the available unit of money
on this option. However, the player can only rely on past outcomes.
This is where the Hedge or multiplicative updates algorithm [SE95] enters
in order to possibly guide the player’s hand. Hedge maintains a vector wt =
(wt1, w
t
2, . . . , w
t
n) of weights, such that w
t
i ≥ 0 (t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1, and i =
1, 2, . . . , N). In each round t Hedge chooses the bet allocation to be
pti =
wti∑N
i=1 w
t
i
(3)
When the t’th round loss vector is revealed, wt is updated by using
wt+1i = w
t
iβ
`ti (4)
for some fixed β, such that 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.
Our objective is to find the worst possible performance of Hedge over all
possible responses of the multi-armed bandit during a game of fixed duration.
1.4 Overview of previous results
In [ACBFS95] Auer et al. have proved that the performance of Hedge is asymp-
totically optimal for the non generalized game, the error being O(
√
TN lnN).
Note that the theorem holds for players that do not use mixed strategies. In the
“optimal” game the player is supposed to choose the same overall most favorable
option in each round, i.e. the option with the lowest loss over the whole game.
The model used in [ACBFS95] effectively considers a machine with N arms
that is somehow imperfect and produces statistically unbalanced results. In a
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perfect machine all arms would be identical, but in an imperfect machine there
is an arm that statistically produces the most favorable results. The intention of
the player is to discover exactly this arm. Since the player cannot predict the
outcome of any arm in a specific round, the optimal strategy of the player would
be to always bet on the same most favorable arm. It would take possibly a lot of
time and money before a real player would be able to gather enough statistics,
that will determine the best arm. The aforementioned theorem guarantees that
Hedge somehow digs out this information for the player that has no previous
experience with the machine.
Hedge has become quite popular recently and in different fields. For exam-
ple, Chastain et al. have shown that Hedge is also applicable in coordination
games and evolution theory and have noted that this algorithm “has surprised
us time and again with its seemingly miraculous performance and applicabil-
ity” [CLPV14].
There is also a number of Hedge variations and alternatives. Auer, Cesa-
Bianchi et al. have proposed the Exp3 algorithm in [ACBFS02]. Allenberg-
Neeman and Neeman proposed the GL (Gain-Loss) algorithm, for the full
information game [ANN04]. Dani, Hayes, and Kakade have proposed the Geo-
metricHedge algorithm in [DKH08]. A modification was also proposed by Bartlett,
Dani et al. in [BDH+08]. Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi have proposed the ComBand
algorithm for the bandit version [CBL12]. A comparison of algorithms can be
found in the paper by Uchiya et al. [UNK10].
In two previous works of ours [AL14, AL15] we have mentioned a number
of application areas and problems, that could make use of the multi-armed
bandit game with upper-bounded loss in a each round, i.e. as modified by (2).
Possible applications include path selection in computer networking, and network
interdiction with applications in the area of transportation and border control.
In the aforementioned works we have studied the worst possible performance
of Hedge (when it guides the player’s hand in the aforementioned multi-armed
bandit game) by exploring the penalty sequence vectors that maximize the
player’s total loss. In particular, in [AL14] we have given a methodology for
the calculation of the maximum total loss that is suffered by the player, and
also for the calculation of the associated penalty vectors that are produced by
the multi-armed bandit machine. We have also provided a formula for the total
loss and the associated penalties that is a recursive function of the number of
rounds and can be exploited for the numerical calculation of the performance
of multiple round games. By using this recursive calculation we can get a fair
idea of the “optimal” behavior of the machine (which is of course worst for the
player). In general the resulting optimal penalty vectors are real valued, but it
appears that they become binary after a number of rounds. In [AL14] we have
shown that if the penalties are restricted to binary values, the machine’s optimal
plan (worst for the player) can be easily calculated by using a greedy algorithm.
A consequence of greediness is that the penalty plan becomes periodic, and the
losses suffered by the player become also periodic.
In [AL15] we have given details and examples of analytic calculation of the
optimal plan from the machine’s viewpoint, together with the resulting total
loss. The results have shown that the optimal penalties are generally non binary,
at least in the first few rounds. However, the calculation of the optimal penalty
plan in terms of closed form formulas appears to be partly infeasible and partly
too complicated as the number of rounds T of the game increases. Complexity
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shows on the shape of the maximum total loss, which is a continuous curve with
lots of kinks, i.e. points of sudden slope change.
1.5 New contributions
In summary, in our past work (a) we have provided numerical results and
examples, (b) we have shown that the optimal binary penalty scheme is greedy,
and (c) we have provided accurate results for games of short duration (up to
three rounds).
In this paper we have more or less completed the analysis of the aforemen-
tioned problem:
1. We show how a game of any number of rounds can be analyzed accurately,
by reducing its solution to a single variable optimization problem.
2. We calculate the distance between the optimal solution and a greedy binary
solution, and we show that the binary solution is actually a very good
approximation.
3. We describe the general “nature” of the optimal solution, which is greedy
if the number of rounds does not exceed a well defined limit, but past
this limit the optimal scheme evolves in an optimized periodic scheme.
Effectively, the complexity of the problem is polynomial.
4. We give an explicit solution if the player starts Hedge with equal arm
weights.
In summary, although some minor details can still be filled in, we give a full
solution to the problem of the worst performance of Hedge when the multi-armed
bandit functions under a limited penalty budget.
Finally a note on the methodology used in this paper: In order to calculate
the worst performance of Hedge we try to determine the bandit machine behavior
that is most unfavorable to the player. This approach is consistent with the
so called “adversarial analysis” of online algorithms. According to S. Irani and
A. Karlin (in section 13.3.1 of [Hoc96]) a technique in finding bounds is to use
an “adversary” who plays against an algorithm A and concocts an input, which
forces A to incur a high cost. In our analysis the adversary tries to maximize
Hedge’s total loss by controling the penalty vector.
Although an “adversary” is a fictional methodological aid for the aforemen-
tioned analysis, there are applications and problem interpretations that make use
of a real adversary. In [AL14] we have described a collection of such applications,
e.g. network interdiction and border control.
2 The loss maximization problem
2.1 Problem formulation
The “adversary” controls the bandit machine so as to maximize the player’s
losses. A naive adversary would probably use the greedy approach, i.e. the
adversary would maximally penalize the option with the highest bet, i.e. in round
t the adversary would set `tj = 1 for the option j, such that p
t
j = maxi=1,...,N p
t
i.
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We shall see later that this approach is less naive than expected. However,
in principle a more sophisticated adversary would be expected to solve an
optimization problem that takes into account the whole duration of the game.
We assume that the “adversary” is aware of the fact that the player is playing
Hedge and is also aware of the value of the adjustment speed parameter β. Then
the adversary has to solve the following optimization problem [AL14]:
Problem 1 Given a number of options N , an initial normalized weight vector
w = (w1, w2, . . . , wN ), and a Hedge parameter β, find the sequence `
0, `1, . . .,
`T−1 that maximizes the player’s total cumulative loss
LH(β) =
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
pti`
t
i (5)
where `t = (`t1, . . . , `
t
N ) is the penalty vector in round t (t = 0, 1, . . . , T −1), such
that
∑N
i=1 `
t
i = 1, and the penalty weights p
t
i in round t are updated according to
Hedge, i.e.
wti = w
t−1
i β
`t−1i , pti =
wti∑N
i=1 w
t
i
(t ≥ 1) (6)
for t = 1, . . . , T − 1, and p0i = wi. 2
Clearly the objective function (5) is a function of the N initial weights wi, the
N × T variables `ti, and β. Due to the normalization of weights and penalties
there are in total (N − 1) × (T + 1) + 1 independent variables. The player
chooses the N − 1 independent initial weights, and β, and lets Hedge make
all future decisions. The (N − 1)× T independent penalty variables are under
the control of the bandit machine, i.e. the adversary. In the following we
use LT−1(w1, . . . , wN ; `01, . . . , `
0
N , . . . , `
T−1
1 , . . . , `
T−1
N ) or L
T−1(w; `0, . . . , `T−1)
instead of LH(β) whenever it is necessary to refer to these variables.
For the adversary problem 1 is a well defined maximization problem. Analysis
should aim at finding the maximum value of LH(β), as given by (5), together
with the penalty vectors `0, `1, . . ., `T−1 that achieve the maximum. We show
that an iterative solution is possible, but it hardly produces any closed form
solutions. We shall also see that numerical results for LH(β) as a function of the
initial weights. The analysis of short games, i.e. games with a small number
of rounds T , as given in [AL15], has shown that the optimal strategy of the
adversary soon ends up with extreme penalty values, which in this case become
binary due to normalization. This means that the optimal penalties, from the
adversary’s viewpoint, may take values between zero and one in the first few
rounds, but soon the adversary is obliged to place all the available penalty (i.e.
one unit) into a single option in each round. On the other hand, we have shown
in [AL14] that the optimal strategy, under the assumption of binary penalties,
is greedy (and simple to calculate). A straightforward conclusion that follows
from the greediness is that the optimal binary strategy is also periodic. This
means that the adversary assigns a unitary penalty to a different option in each
round in a cyclic manner, the cycle consisting of N rounds, where N is the
number of options (provided of course that the game duration T is long enough
to accommodate more than one cycles).
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3 First results
In this section we reiterate some of the so far known results. Firstly, we give an
outline of the recursive properties of the optimal solution to Problem 1. Then
we use these properties in producing an initial set of numerical results.
3.1 Iterative properties of the optimal solution
If in the current round the player (guided by Hedge) bets according to a weight vec-
tor v = (v1, . . . , vN ), and the adversary generates penalties ` = (`1, . . . , `N ), then
in the next round the player will use weightsW (v, `) = (W1(v, `), . . . ,WN (v, `)),
where
Wi(v, `) =
viβ
`i∑N
j=1 vjβ
`j
(i = 1, 2, . . . , N) (7)
The total loss of a T round game, which starts with weights w, can be written
as the sum of the losses of a single round game, which starts with weightsw, and a
T−1 round game, which starts with weightsW (w, `) = (W1(w, `) . . . ,WN (w, `)),
i.e.
LT−1(w; `0, `1, . . . , `T−1) = L0(w; `0) + LT−2
(
W (w, `0); `1, . . . , `T−1
)
(8)
Assuming that the solution to Problem 1 is
LT−1max (w) = max
`0,...,`T−1
LT−1(w; `0, . . . , `T−1)
the following iterative formula for LT−1max (w) can be derived from (8):
LT−1max (w) = max
`
[
L0(w; `) + LT−2max (W (w, `))
]
(9)
where `0 = ` is the penalty vector chosen by the adversary in the initial round.
The associated optimal penalties can also be computed iteratively. Let
λT−1;t(w) = (λT−1;t1 (w), . . . , λ
T−1;t
N (w)), where λ
T−1;t
i (w) denotes the optimal
penalty of the i’th option in the t’th round of a T round game (starting with
weights w). Then, the optimal penalties are given by the following formulas:
λT−1;0(w) = arg max
`
[
L0(w; `) + LT−2max (W (w, `))
]
(10)
λT−1;t+1(w) = λT−2;t(W (w,λT−1;0(w))) (t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 2) (11)
More details of the derivation together with sample calculations can be found
in [AL14].
3.2 Numerical results based on the iterative solution
The numerical calculation is based on sampling the initial weight vector w.
For example, if N = 2, then the initial weights are, say, w and 1 − w, and
LT−1max (w) = L
T−1
max (w). The calculation starts with L
0
max(w) for samples of
w = k∆w, and continues for L1max(w), L
2
max(w), . . . The accuracy of the outcome
is conditional on the sampling resolution, i.e. on ∆w, and a sufficiently accurate
computation for a game with more rounds requires an increased resolution. We
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give an example of the outcome of such a computation in Fig. 1, in which we
have used a rather exaggerated value of β in order to expose the shapes of the
curves more clearly. The curves are non linear and exhibit lots of sharp points.
An example of the calculation of the associated penalties is given in Section 6.
Figure 1: Plot of LTmax(w) (maximum loss of a T + 1 round game) vs. w for
β = 0.1 and T = 0, 1, . . . , 9.
Note that formula (9) does not imply that an optimal adversarial strategy
for a T − 1 round game is the same as the strategy of the first T − 1 rounds in
a T round game, due to the fact that given an initial vector of weights, LT−2max
enters the computation for LT−1max with a different vector of weights than the
initial vector. In other words, the total number of rounds affects the choice of
penalties in the initial rounds too.
3.3 Initial observations on the expected solution
The obvious attack to the problem is to directly use(9) (and (11) for the penalties).
In [AL15] we have provided detailed results for N = 2 option games with 1, 2,
and 3 rounds (T = 0, 1, 2). The results clearly illustrate the complexity of the
analytic approach, mainly due to the fact that there is a population of sharp
points of the function LTmax(w) that grows with the number of rounds, and
requires very long formulas for the calculation of the values of w that produce
the sharp points. Also, these results can possibly give some initial indications
on the nature of the expected solution to the general problem.
Example 1 Two and three round games starting with equal weights: Consider
the case w = 1/2, which means that the player begins the first round by equally
distributing the bet to the two available options. Note that the choice w = 1/2
is optimal for the player, as indicated by the results in [AL15] and also by the
numerical results of Fig. 1. In a single round game the loss outcome for the
player is 12 × `+ 12 × (1− `) = `/2, i.e. constant regardless of the adversary’s
choice of penalties ` and 1 − `. In a two round game the analysis in [AL15]
shows that the adversary should use penalties `0 = (0, 1) in the first round and
`1 = (1, 0) in the second round (i.e. to put all the available penalty to the first
option in the first round, and to the second option in the second round), or vice
versa. By using this strategy the adversary will inflict on the player a total loss
equal to 1/2 + 1/(1 + β). So far the optimal penalties are binary.
9
round t wt1 w
t
2 `
t
1 `
t
2 loss in round t
0 1/2 1/2 1 0 1/2
1
1
2β
1
1
2β
1+ 12β
0 =
β
1+β
1
2β
0
1
2β
1+ 12β
0 =
1
1+β 0 1 1/(1 + β)
2
β
1+β β
0
β
1+β β
0+ β1+β β
1
= 12
1
1+β β
1
β
1+β β
0+ 11+β β
1
= 12 1 0 1/2
3 β/(1 + β) 1/(1 + β) 0 1 1/(1 + β)
Table 1: Extension of the two round game
However, in a three round game the optimal policy for the adversary is
(`0, `1, `2) =
(
( 34 ,
1
4 ), (0, 1), (1, 0)
)
or vice versa, i.e.
(
( 14 ,
3
4 ), (1, 0), (0, 1)
)
. Both
choices give a total loss equal to 1/2 + 2/(1 +
√
β). This time the first round
penalties are fractional, while the 2nd and 3rd round penalties remain binary
as before. This example shows (a) that the optimal penalties can be fractional
and (b) that the optimal penalties of any round depend on the total number of
rounds. 2
Example 2 Periodic extension of the previous game: At this point let us make
a few observations on the possible extension of the aforementioned two and
three round schemes, which can serve as an introduction to periodic schemes.
In Table 1 we show the loss that results from the periodic extension of the two
round scheme, i.e. from the cyclic repetition of the penalties chosen by the
adversary in the first two rounds. We present the next two rounds only, but the
scheme could be cyclically extended to an arbitrary number of rounds. If this
game is repeated for an even number of rounds, the average loss per round is
equal to
1
2
(
1
2
+
1
1 + β
)
Note that the choice of penalties could also be the outcome of a greedy algorithm
for the adversary. Next, in Table 2, we give the periodic extension of the second
and third round of the three round example, i.e. we exclude the very first round
from the periodic scheme. Note, again, that this could be a greedy scheme for
the adversary. The loss per round in this second example (excluding the very
first round) is
1
1 +
√
β
and it is easy to prove that 1
1+
√
β
> 12
(
1
2 +
1
1+β
)
for 0 < β < 1. Thus, the
cyclic strategy of Table 2 is superior to the cyclic strategy of Table 1 (from the
adversary’s viewpoint). Effectively, by resorting to a fractional penalty in the
first round, the adversary is able to improve the long term behavior. 2
3.4 The binary case
Analytic results from short games and numerical results from arbitrary length
games have provided strong indications that the optimal penalties (from the
adversary’s viewpoint) quickly become binary and remain so for the rest of the
game. However, given the assumption that the sum of penalties equals one, an
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round t wt1 w
t
2 `
t
1 `
t
2 loss
0 1/2 1/2 1/4 3/4 1/2
1
1
2β
1
4
1
2β
1
4 + 12β
3
4
= 1
1+
√
β
1
2β
3
4
1
2β
1
4 + 12β
3
4
=
√
β
1+
√
β
1 0 1
1+
√
β
2
1
1+
√
β
β1
1
1+
√
β
β1+
√
β
1+
√
β
β0
=
√
β
1+
√
β
√
β
1+
√
β
β0
1
1+
√
β
β1+
√
β
1+
√
β
β0
= 1
1+
√
β
0 1 1
1+
√
β
3 1
1+
√
β
√
β
1+
√
β
1 0 1
1+
√
β
Table 2: Extension of the three round game
additional binary penalty assumption implies that only one penalty component
is equal to one, while all other components remain equal to zero. Effectively, the
adversary is able to (maximally) punish exactly one option in each round.
We have shown in [AL14] that a binary penalty assumption results to (a) a
greedy optimal penalty scheme for the adversary, which further implies that (b)
the optimal scheme ends up in being a rotating scheme (for all rounds t, such
that t > t0 for some t0). The optimal scheme for the adversary is to assign a
penalty equal to one to the option with the highest bet. In a set of initial rounds
this strategy results into a near equalization of the bet distribution (over the
options), since in each round t the adversary always inflicts a unitary penalty
on the option with the maximum wti (i = 1, . . . , N), effectively driving Hedge
to push the option i weight downwards. Due to the quantized nature of the
weight adjustments, the bet components (weights) never become exactly equal,
but they become almost equal to each other and to 1/N within a margin. Then
in each round the currently maximum weight is pushed below all other weights.
Moreover, in this second phase the greedy adversarial algorithm effectively
becomes a rotating scheme.
4 Rotating schemes
This is a brief section on rotating schemes, which serves as a preparation for the
analysis of games that are long enough so as to include a rotational phase in
their optimal adversarial scheme.
4.1 Periodic penalties will produce periodic weights and
periodic losses
While the Hedge algorithm aids the player to adapt the bet mixture so as to
avoid the penalties imposed by the adversary, the latter may try to rotate the
penalties, so as to make adaptation difficult. In this section we explore the
dynamics of Hedge under rotating penalty schemes. Hedge responds to a penalty
rotation with weight rotation, as shown by the following lemma, which is valid
for an N option game:
Lemma 1 Assume a rotating penalty scheme
`ti+1 = `
t−1
i (i = 1, . . . , N − 1), `t1 = `t−1N (12)
i.e. option i + 1 at time t inherits the penalty of the previous option i in the
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previous round t− 1. Then the response of Hedge generates a loss in each round
that is also periodic, i.e. it repeats itself after N rounds. 2
Note that (12) implies that penalties repeat themselves after N rounds:
`N+ti = `
N
i (i = 1, . . . , N) (t = 0, . . . , T −N) (13)
and in general
`τi = `
0
τ+i mod N (14)
The proof of the above lemma is straightforward: Since wt+1i = w
t
iβ
`ti
wt+Ni = w
t
iβ
∑N−1
k=0 `
t+k
i = wtiβ
∑N−1
k=0 `
0
t+i+k mod N = wtiβ
∑N−1
k=0 `
0
k = wtiβ
Λ
where
∑N−1
k=0 `
0
k = Λ is the sum of all the penalties in the initial or, due to the
rotation, in any other round, and due to the normalization
pt+Ni = p
t
i
In fact, a periodic scheme would prevent Hedge from focusing on a single option.
In Example 9 (see Appendix A) the net loss performance is calculated for binary
penalties.
4.2 Periodic weights for maximum loss
As explained in section 4, the adversary may use proper penalties with an aim
to drive Hedge towards weights that will maximize loss in the rotation phase.
Currently we calculate the optimal weights without exploring how the adversary
might possibly force Hedge to adopt these weights. The latter issue is examined
later in this paper.
We simplify our calculations by exploring a two option game. Let Lp denote
the total loss per cycle, i.e. the cumulative loss in two consecutive rounds.
Assuming that periodic behavior will start at t0, which we set equal to 0 without
loss of generality, let (w, 1 − w) the pair of weights at t = t0. Assuming (also
without loss of generality) that w ≥ 1/2 (which also implies that w ≥ 1 − w),
the adversary will choose penalties (`t01 , `
t0
2 ) = (1, 0), therefore the new pair of
weights will be (
wβ
wβ + 1− w,
1− w
wβ + 1− w
)
In the next round the adversary will choose penalties (`t0+11 , `
t0+1
2 ) = (0, 1), and
the new pair of weights will be (w, 1 − w) again. The cumulative gain of the
adversary (loss of the player) in both rounds will be
Lp(w) = w +
1− w
wβ + 1− w
which is maximized w.r.t. w for
w =
1
1 +
√
β
Therefore the adversary would like to start with a pair of weights equal to(
1
1 +
√
β
,
√
β
1 +
√
β
)
(15)
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and by imposing a pair of penalties (1, 0) the pair of weights( √
β
1 +
√
β
,
1
1 +
√
β
)
will appear in the next round, and again the adversary will return to the original
pair by using penalties (0, 1). The cumulative loss in these two rounds will be
Lp =
2
1 +
√
β
which for the adversary amounts to a constant gain 1/(1 +
√
β) per round.
The pair (1/(1 +
√
β),
√
β/(1 +
√
β)) is for the adversary an attractive pair of
weights given a sufficient time horizon T , so that this rotational steady state can
be reached. However these values can in general be achieved by the adversary
only by using fractional (i.e. non binary) penalties in at least one round.
A straightforward generalization for N options gives the optimal weights as
w∗i =
(1− β 1N )β i−1N
1− β , i = 1, . . . , N
and the loss per period of N rounds is equal to
N(1− β1/N )
1− β
5 Solutions with binary penalties
It is possible to find a suboptimal solution by constraining the solution to binary
penalties and using a greedy algorithm. In this section we summarize certain
results of previous work [AL14].
First, we reiterate the main idea in the analysis of binary penalties: If the
current weights are (w, 1 − w), a pair of penalties (1, 0) would transform the
weights to (
wβ
wβ + 1− w,
1− w
wβ + 1− w
)
,
while penalties (0, 1) would produce weights equal to(
w
w + (1− w)β ,
(1− w)β
w + (1− w)β
)
=
(
wβ−1
wβ−1 + 1− w,
1− w
wβ−1 + 1− w
)
Let us define
f(w, x) ≡ wβ
x
wβx + 1− w, (16)
but we drop w whenever it is obvious and write f(x). By using this notation,
in one round the first option weight moves from f(0) = w either to f(β), or to
f(−β). In n rounds, if the number of first option penalties that are equal to 1 is
k, the weights before normalization are (wβk, (1− w)βn−k), therefore the first
option weight is
wβk
wβk + (1− w)βn−k =
wβ2n−k
wβ2n−k + 1− w
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Effectively, each new round brings a move on f(x) such that x increases or
decreases by one (penalty) unit. In each move the adversary has the option to
increase the player’s loss (i.e. the adversary’s gain) by f(x) by moving to x+ 1,
or increase it by 1− f(x) and move to x− 1. The rest of the analysis in [AL14]
explains why this walk on the curve f(x) can be optimal for the adversary by
making greedy choices (i.e. move to x+ 1 if f(x) ≥ 1/2 ≥ 1− f(x), otherwise
move to x− 1). The main idea in this proof is that each forward move (towards
x + 1) is for the adversary a high gain move if f(x) ≥ 1/2 ≥ 1 − f(x), but it
decreases the weight, thus it also decreases the possible gain in the next moves.
However, we have proven that any attempt of the adversary to “invest in the
future”, by currently accepting a lower gain (equal to 1− f(x) instead of f(x))
and by moving backwards, will never be able to produce adequate future gains
that will justify the current sacrifice. This result is summarized in the following
lemma:
Lemma 2 The optimal solution with binary penalties is greedy.
6 How to calculate the optimal penalties
6.1 Introductory remarks and an example
Firstly we give some numerical results using expressions (9), (10), and (11).
Example 3 We set β = 0.8 and T = 10 and produce the total cumulative loss
numerically by using formulas 9, 10, and 11. We have quantized the possible
values of the (first option) initial weight w to values equal to i/10000, where
i = 0, 1, 2 . . . , 10000; therefore the total cumulative losses, the penalties etc as
functions of w are vectors of 10001 components. The resulting total cumulative
loss vs w is shown on Fig. 2, while Fig. 3 shows the (first option) penalties of
different rounds that have led to this result. Let us summarize a few initial
observations:
1. As expected, there is an even symmetry for the total cumulative loss, i.e.
LT−1max (w) = L
T−1
max (1−w) and an odd symmetry for the associated penalties,
i.e. `t1(w) = 1− `t1(1− w).
2. Non binary penalty values occur mostly in the first round. There is also
an occurrence in the second round, but not in both rounds in the same
game. The non binary values are limited to distinct small areas of w in
the first round. Both the lengths of these areas and the aberrations from
the binary values are quite limited. Some of these areas have been marked
with vertical lines at both ends.
3. For w very close to 0 or 1 all penalties are equal to 0 or 1 respectively,
while for w very close to 1/2 there is a pattern of alternating binary
penalties. Clearly, there is a first phase of high gains per round, in which
the adversary tries to take maximum advantage of the largest weight by
always penalizing the same option, and a second phase, in which the
weights oscillate between two values that are close to 1/2. Therefore, in
this second phase the adversary cannot extract an average per round gain
significantly higher than 1/2. The length of the first phase depends on the
14
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Figure 2: Total cumulative loss after T = 10 rounds vs initial (first option)
weight w (for β = 0.8).
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Figure 3: Round i first option penalty `i1 vs initial (first option) weight w (for
β = 0.8).
initial weight w (and on β). The closer the value of w is to 1/2, the sooner
the game enters the phase of rotation.
We name the first phase “the transitional phase”, and the second phase “the
rotational phase”, and we define the precise limit between the two phases later
on. 2
Assuming a weight w (for the first option) at some round, if the adversary
chooses a penalty x such that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 (for the first option, and 1− x for the
second option), the player’s loss in this round will be equal to wx+(1−w)(1−x),
and the new (first option) weight that will appear in the next round is equal to
wβx
wβx + (1− w)β1−x =
wβ2x−1
wβ2x−1 + 1− w
In each round the adversary can choose any value of x between 0 and 1, but
(assuming that w > 1/2) the new weight will be smaller or greater than w
depending on whether x > 1/2 or x < 1/2 respectively, and will remain the same
if x = 1/2.
In general, if the sum of first option penalties is equal to x in the next n
rounds, the pre-normalized weights will be (wβx, (1 − w)βn−x), and the final
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first option weight will be
wβx
wβx + (1− w)βn−x =
wβ2x−n
wβ2x−n + 1− w = f (2x− n) ,
where f(x) = f(w, x) is defined by (16).
6.2 The transitional phase
We use the above observation to prove some useful minor theorems. The first
one describes a situation, in which the initial weights (w01, w
0
2) = (w, 1− w) are
unequal, and their relative size cannot be reversed in the next n1 rounds, i.e.
wβn1 > 1− w (n1 ≤ bln 1−ww / lnβc). Under this assumption we show that in a
game with T ≤ n rounds the optimal strategy of the adversary is the greedy
strategy, i.e. to set all first option penalties to 1, instead of using any fractional
penalties. First, we give the following lemma:
Lemma 3 If 0 < β < 1, w > 1/2, n is such that wβn+1 > 1−w, and 0 <  ≤ 1,
then for f(x) (as defined by (16)) the following inequality is valid:
(1− )f(0) +  [1− f(0)] +
n∑
k=1
f(k − 2 ) <
n∑
k=0
f(k) (17)
Effectively, in a game of T rounds starting with w01 = w such that w > 1/(1+β
T )
(i.e. the number of rounds is not sufficient to reverse the balance of weights
between the two options after the end of the game, even if the first option is
always maximally penalized), the optimal policy of the adversary is the greedy
one, i.e. to use unitary penalties in all rounds (`i1 = 1 for i = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1).
Although the first part of this lemma strictly states that a non binary penalty
should not be chosen in the initial round, it can also be used to exclude a non-
binary step in any intermediate round if we assume that the game starts exactly
at this round. In addition, it will be shown in a later lemma that the earlier
a “sacrifice” (i.e. a deviation from the greedy policy, which gives a maximum
short term gain to the adversary) is, the more effective it is for the adversary.
Therefore any sacrifice should be undertaken in the very first round. The above
lemma can be proved by induction. However, we have omitted the proof.
We shall give an interpretation of the above lemma and a few additional details.
Consider Fig. 4. The initial weights are (w01, w
0
2) = (w, 1−w) = (f(0), 1− f(0)).
If the adversary implements the greedy strategy continuously for the next n
rounds, the first option weights are f(x0), f(x1), . . . f(xn), where x0 = 0, and
xk+1 = xk + 2`
k
1 = xk + 2× 1− 1 = xk − 1. Therefore, under the greedy strategy
the first option weights are f(0), f(1), . . . , f(n) (i.e. the white dots) and the
player’s total loss (in n+ 1 rounds) is f(0) + f(1) + . . .+ f(n). On the other
hand, the adversary could choose to make a sacrifice in the first round, so as to
imcrease loss in the remaining rounds as shown by the black dots. Effectively,
Lemma 4 states that the sacrifice in the first round cannot be counterbalanced
by the improved weights in all subsequent rounds. Note, however, that Lemma 4
holds if the initial weight w is such that wβT > 1 − w, i.e. if the weight that
would appear in a T + 1’th round (that does not exist) would still be above 1/2.
If w > 1/2, but wβT < 1 − w, the area in which rotational schemes are
possible is reachable by the adversary by continuously using penalties equal to 1
16
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Figure 4: Interpretion figure for Lemma 3.
until the weight of option 1 falls below 1/2. In the rest of the game the adversary
could use an optimized rotation scheme. In order to reach this optimized rotation
the adversary may need to make a fractional penalty sacrifice at some point.
Assuming that such a non greedy step should be taken, the question of its timing
emerges. Should the non greedy step be taken just before entering rotation or
perhaps earlier? A lemma that will soon be introduced states this step should
be executed as early as possible.
Before dealing with the problem of optimally entering the rotation phase,
we shall briefly examine a marginal case, in which the weight of the final round
gets so close to 1/2, that it would fall below 1/2 if an additional round existed.
Effectively, this implies for the initial weight that w ≥ 1/(1 + βT−1), but
w < 1/(1 + βT ), therefore Lemma 3 would not be valid. The optimal policy
of the adversary is to make a non binary adjustment in the first round, which
will improve the gains of the greedy moves in all subsequent rounds. Therefore,
in this marginal situation it can be proved that the optimal set of penalties is
(`01, `
1
1, . . . , `
T−1
1 ) = (1− , 1, . . . , 1). The correct value of  can be found by using
direct optimization of the resulting single variable objective function for the total
cumulative loss, and it approaches zero as w moves from 1/(1 + βT ) towards
1/(1 + βT−1). In fact, extensive numerical tests provide strong indication that
there is a marginal value wm ∈ (1/(1 + βT−1), 1/(1 + βT )) such that the optimal
 is zero if w ≥ wm, but it is non zero as w becomes lower than wm and it grows
linearly as w approaches the lower end of this area, i.e. 1/(1 +βT−1). Numerical
tests also show that for w = 1/(1 + βT−1) the optimal  is around 1/4 regardless
of the value of β. Effectively this means that given an initial weight w in the
interval 1/(1 + βT ) towards 1/(1 + βT−1), the adversary will need to maximize
the total cumulative loss w.r.t. , and the expected outcome is between zero and
1/4. However, the analysis given in the above few lines is probably too detailed
and all that is necessary is the following lemma, which is given without proof:
Lemma 4 If 1/(1 +βT−1) ≤ w < 1/(1 +βT ), there is an , such that 0 <  ≤ 1,
for which the optimal policy of the adversary is achieved by setting `01 = 1− ,
and `i1 = 1 in the remaining rounds i = 1, . . . , T − 1. 2
Effectively, if the assumptions of Lemma 4 are true, the inequality (17) may
be reversed for some  > 0. Note, however, that the weight wT−11 that enters the
last round is still above 1/2, therefore Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 are separated by
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a very thin line. Both lemmas assume that the (first option) weight will never
fall below 1/2 at any round, but Lemma 4 states that special care is needed in
the first round if the final round weight is likely to come very close to 1/2.
The last lemma of this section states (as already promised) that if a non
binary penalty must be used, it should appear as early as possible. The lemma
compares two scenarios: In the first scenario the fractional step precedes a
sequence of n successive unit penalty steps, while in the second scenario the
fractional step follows the unit steps. The loss in the first scenario (with an
analysis similar to the analysis of Lemma 3) is f(0)(1− ) + (1− f(0)) in the
first round, and f(k − ), (k = 1, 2, . . . , n) in the following n rounds. This gives
a total loss equal to
f(0)(1− ) + (1− f(0))+
n∑
k=1
f(k − )
In the second scenario the fractional penalty is used in the last round, thereby
giving a total loss equal to
n−1∑
k=0
f(k) + f(n)(1− ) + (1− f(n)).
The proof of the lemma can be produced by induction, starting from two rounds
(n = 1).
Lemma 5 If 0 < β < 1, w > 1/2, n is such that wβn > 1− w, and 0 <  ≤ 1,
then for f(x) (as defined by (16)) the following inequality is valid:
n−1∑
k=0
f(k)+f(n)(1− )+(1−f(n)) < f(0)(1− )+(1−f(0))+
n∑
k=1
f(k− ) 2
Note that both scenarios of Lemma 5 produce the same final weight wn+11 =
f(n+ 2− 2); this is not true for the previous lemmas in this section. The final
weight f(n + 2 − 2) is greater than 1/2 due to the assumption wβn > 1 − w.
The final weight could serve as a target weight; for example it could be set equal
to the ideal weight 1/(1 +
√
β) or some other suitable value. Lemma 5 states
that the non binary penalty step should be taken as early as possible.
We are now about to examine games that are long enough to produce (first
option) weights lower than 1/2. Before stating any additional lemmas we define
the “intersection area”: This is an area of weights around 1/2, and includes any
weight from which 1/2 is reachable in a single round. Effectively this implies
a penalty equal to 1, if the starting weight is greater than 1/2, or a penalty
equal to 0, if the starting weight is lower than 1/2. Therefore the upper limit
of this area is a weight u1, such that u1β/(u1β + 1 − u1) = 1/2, which gives
u1 = 1/(1 + β), and the lower limit is u2, such that u2/(u2 + (1− u2)β) = 1/2,
which gives u2 = β/(1 + β). Thus the “intersection area” is the interval
[β/(1 +β), 1/(1 +β)].This area obviously includes the optimal rotational weights√
β/(1 +
√
β) and 1/(1 +
√
β), which are reachable from one another with binary
penalties.
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6.3 Entering the rotational phase
If wβT−1 > 1 − w the adversary cannot reach a weight below 1/2 ever in the
game. According to the previous lemmas, if the initial weight is somewhat
greater, i.e. it is such that wβT > 1− w (which implies wβT−1 > 1− w), then
the optimal policy of the adversary is to use a sequence of penalties equal to
(1, 1, . . . , 1). If, however, wβT−1 > 1−w holds marginally so that wβT < 1−w,
the adversary might benefit from using a non binary first round penalty. Finally,
if wβT−1 < 1− w, a penalty sequence equal to (1, 1, . . . , 1) will eventually bring
the weight below 1/2. In the rest of this paper we shall see that the adversary’s
optimal plan is roughly to bring the current weight (pt1) as fast as possible from
the initial weight w = p01 to a value close to 1/2, and then produce weights
that rotate around 1/2 (by using a sequence of alternating 0 and 1 penalties).
However, as devil is in the details, we shall also see that there is the issue of
optimally approaching the most suitable rotating weights, while both the optimal
approach and the most suitable weight values depend on the total length T of
the game. All these issues will be explored by using a number of lemmas.
The optimal weights are not necessarily those given by (15). Assume that
the latest weight achieved by a so far greedy adversary is u and that u is about
to enter the intersection area, in the sense that in two rounds the weight could
plunge below 1/2, i.e. it is such that uβ2 < 1− u, although uβ > 1− u (i.e. one
round is not enough to reach 1/2). Suppose also that somehow the adversary
has computed w′ as the ideal weight for the future, and intends to approach w′
as soon as possible. For example, under certain conditions the ideal weight w′
could be equal to 1/(1 +
√
β). If by any chance uβ/(uβ + 1 − u) = w′, then
the adversary can (still be considered “lucky” and) set the next penalty equal
to 1 and reach w′ in one round. If uβ/(uβ + 1− u) = w′ −  for some small ,
the adversary can still consider himself “lucky”: He can use a penalty 1− δ for
some small suitable δ, and reach the desired weight by sacrificing a small part of
the gains. If, however, uβ/(uβ + 1− u) = w′ + , the weight w′ is unreachable
in just one round. The adversary could possibly use penalties (1/2 + δ, 1) or
(1, 1/2 + δ), in order to reach w′, but a penalty equal to 1/2 + δ is implies a
significant sacrifice (as compared to a penalty equal to 1 applied on the greatest
weight). A better solution is to let the first option weight fall below 1/2 by
applying a penalty vector (1, 1) in the next two rounds, and then approach the
target weight from below by penalizing the now stronger second option weight
with a penalty `2 = 1− δ. The next two lemmas state the appropriate policy
when the adversary is about to approach to a target weight w′.
Lemma 6 Assuming that a game starts with w, and w′ is a target weight such
that 1/2 < w ≤ w′ < 1/(1 + β), and the adversary’s intention is to achieve w′
within two rounds, and x, x1, x2 are such that f(x − 2) = w′, x = x1 + x2 ⇒
f(x1 + x2 − 2) = w′, 0 < x1 < x ≤ 1, 0 < x2 ≤ 1, then the adversary should
prefer the penalty vector (`01, `
1
1) = (x, 0) over the (less greedy) penalty vector
(x1, x2). In other words
wx+ (1− w)(1− x) + (1− w)β
1−x
wβx + (1− w)β1−x >
wx1 + (1− w)(1− x1)
+ x2
wβx1
wβx1 + (1− w)β1−x1 + (1− x2)
(1− w)β1−x1
wβx1 + (1− w)β1−x1 . 2
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This situation is shown in Fig. 5a. Both weights w and w′ are above 1/2,
and both are in the intersection area. The lemma states that the adversary
should go for the maximum possible penalties (`01, `
1
1) in each round; this implies
`12 = 1− `11 = 1 in the second round, and the maximum possible penalty in the
first round, such that w′ will be achieved after two rounds. The proof is trivial,
since in both rounds the preferred policy (x, 0) brings a higher gain than the
policy (x1, x2). Next comes the lemma complementary to the previous one for
w > w′, as shown in Fig. 5b.
Lemma 7 Assuming that a game starts with w, and w′ is a target weight such
that 1/2 < w′ ≤ w < 1/(1 + β), and the adversary’s intention is to achieve w′
within two rounds, and x, x1, x2 are such that f(x− 1) = w′, 1 + x = x1 + x2 ⇒
f(x1 + x2 − 2) = w′, 0 < x1 < 1, 0 < x2 < x ≤ 1, then the adversary should
prefer the penalty vector (`01, `
1
1) = (1, x) to the (less greedy) penalty vector
(x1, x2). In other words
w + x
wβ
wβ + 1− w + (1− x)
1− w
wβ + 1− w >
wx1 + (1− w)(1− x1)
+ x2
wβx1
wβx1 + (1− w)β1−x1 + (1− x2)
(1− w)β1−x1
wβx1 + (1− w)β1−x1 . 2
However, the value of the aforementioned sacrifice (or investment) has also
to be weighed against the expected gains from the target weights, whose values
depend on the remaining rounds. The more the remaining rounds are, the better
the justification of approaching the ideal rotational weights is.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Interpretion figure for Lemmas 6 and 7.
Example 4 Assume β = 0.8, w01 = w = 0.5108 and a very large number
of rounds T . In this case the adversary would pursue the pair of weights
((1/(1 +
√
β),
√
β/(1 +
√
β) = (0.5279, 0.4721) for the rotational phase. The
penalty `01 = 0.8469 brings the weight to w
1
1 =
√
β/(1 +
√
β) = 0.4721 and the
next penalty `11 = 0 to w
2
1 = 1/(1 +
√
β) = 0.5279, in accordance with Lemma 6.
In another variant of the same example, assume that w01 = w = 0.6200.
The adversary could reach the target weight in two rounds, while the penalty
vector (1, 1) would bring the weight w21 to the same as above value 0.5108, which
means that a penalty vector (1, 1, 0.8469) would bring the weight w31 to the
target value 0.4721 in three rounds. However, since the adversary now has a
margin of 3 rounds to properly reach the target weight, it is possible to perform
the adjustment in a previous round by opting for penalties (1, 0.8469, 1) or
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(0.8469, 1, 1). In fact the best option is to implement the adjustment in the initial
round, i.e. to choose (0.8469, 1, 1). While the cumulative loss in the first three
rounds is 1.6937 for (1, 1, 0.8469), it is 1.6940 for (0.8469, 1, 1). Of course, the
rest of the loss is the same in the subsequent rounds, i.e. (1/(1 +
√
β) = 0.5279)
per round for the remaining T − 3 rounds of the game.
In yet another variant, assume now that w01 = w = 0.6200 as in the second
variant, but the game length is now restricted to T = 10 rounds. While for
the whole game the initial round adjustment (and then greedy) penalty vector
(0.8469, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) produces a total cumulative loss equal to 5.38908
and is still superior to the third round adjustment (1, 1, 0.8469, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0)
vector, which produces a loss equal to 5.38876, the strictly greedy vector
(1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) is even better as it produces a loss equal to 5.40886.
The per round average loss of the greedy solution in the rotational phase is
inferior to the loss of the adjusted solution (0.52783 vs 0.52786), but the adjusted
solution cannot counterbalance the sacrifice in the first round (first round loss
equal to 0.58326 in the adjusted solution instead of 0.62000 in the greedy solu-
tion). This explains why the optimal penalties in Fig. ?? remain greedy around
w = 0.62. Even direct optimization of the loss produced by the penalty vector
(1− δ, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) w.r.t. δ, produces the solution δ = 0 and confirms the
previous considerations
In a final variant, assume that w = 0.65 (β = 0.8), and T is large. After two
greedy rounds with penalties (1, 1) the current weight w21 is at 0.5431, still above
the target 0.5279, but close. The mirror target 1− 0.5279 is out of reach in one
round. Although the adversary could use a penalty equal to 0.1371 and reach
0.5279, that would be a bad decision, since the situation is more like Fig. 5. The
target can be approached from below in two rounds, by using penalties (`21, `
3
1) =
(1, 0.1371). Effectively the correct policy is (1, 1, 1, 0.1371, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . .). However,
for a short game with T = 10 rounds the greedy policy (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) is
preferable as in the previous variant. 2
In the above lemmas and examples the issue of the proper way of entering
the rotational phase was explored. On occasion this involves a round, in which
an non binary penalty adjustment must be made. If the current weight is u and
the target weight is u′, it is easy to see that the penalty x that achieves the
transition from u to u′ in one round is
x(u, u′) =
1
2
+
ln
(
u′(1−u)
u(1−u′)
)
2 lnβ
(18)
assuming that u′ is reachable from u in a single round, i.e. uβ/(uβ+ 1−w) ≤ u′.
If the adversary has chosen a greedy policy in the first phase, assuming
(sufficiently unequal) initial weights (w, 1−w), the possible (first option) weight
values from which to make a non binary non greedy adjustment are wn1 =
wβn/(wβn + 1−w). If, in addition, the target weight is w∗1 = 1/(1 +
√
β), then
x(wn1 , w
∗
1) =
1
4
− n
2
+
ln
(
1−w
w
)
2 lnβ
Since 0 ≤ x(wn1 , w∗1) ≤ 1, the integer n must satisfy
−3
2
+
ln
(
1−w
w
)
lnβ
≤ n ≤ 1
2
+
ln
(
1−w
w
)
lnβ
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If the target is w∗2 =
√
β/(1 +
√
β)
x(wn1 , w
∗
2) =
3
4
− n
2
+
ln
(
1−w
w
)
2 lnβ
= x(wn1 , w
∗
1) +
1
2
and n must satisfy
−1
2
+
ln
(
1−w
w
)
lnβ
≤ n ≤ 3
2
+
ln
(
1−w
w
)
lnβ
If the adversary is in a greedy first phase, there are only two appropriate
successive values of n for any target weight u′ from the available weights wn1 =
wβn/(wβn + 1− w). The first one is the maximum integer m such that wm1 is
still larger than u′ but wm+11 ≤ u′, and the second one is m+ 1. Suppose also
that u′ is such that u′ > 1/2, but u′′ = u′β/(u′β + 1 − u) < 1/2, i.e. u′ and
u′′ are likely to be used as weights in the rotational phase. Then the adversary
would possibly consider the penalty scenario
(`01, . . . , `
T−1
1 ) = (1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
, x, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . .),
which approaches u′ from above, or the scenario
(`01, . . . , `
T−1
1 ) = (1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
, 1, x, 0, 1, 0, . . .),
which approaches u′ from below, where x is an appropriate non binary penalty.
Now we turn to the proble of choosing the best binary correction. Suppose
that the initial weight w is such that the first option weight could fall below 1/2
in exactly r rounds, i.e. wβr−1 > 1− w, but wβr ≤ 1− w. The greedy penalty
sequence is
(1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
, 0, 1, 0, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
T−r
)
If T − r is even, the total cumulative loss under this sequence is
r−1∑
i=0
f(i) + (1− f(r))T − r
2
+ f(r − 1)T − r
2
,
and if T − r is odd, the loss is
r−1∑
i=0
f(i) + (1− f(r))T − r + 1
2
+ f(r − 1)T − r − 1
2
.
Taking into account the previous discussion, the adversary might try the
sequence
(1, 1, . . . , 1, x, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
, 0, 1, 0, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
T−r
),
assuming that x is close enough to 1, so that wβr−2+x > 1−w, but wβr−1+x ≤
1 − w remains valid. Then for even T − r this sequence would create a total
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cumulative loss equal to
r−3∑
i=0
f(i) + xf(r − 2) + (1− x)[1− f(r − 2)] + f(r + 2x− 3)
+ [1− f(r + 2x− 2)]T − r
2
+ f(r + 2x− 3)T − r
2
However, in this case the adversary would rather pull the adjustment to the very
first round by using the penalty sequence
(x, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r
, 0, 1, 0, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
T−r
),
which yields the following total cumulative loss:
xf(0) + (1− x)[1− f(0)] +
r−1∑
i=1
f(2(x+ i− 1)− i)
+ [1− f(r + 2x− 2)]T − r
2
+ f(r + 2x− 3)T − r
2
(19)
While the most advantageous approach for the adversary depends on the relative
position of wn1 and the target weight, as detailed in previous parts of this section,
the maximum adjustment (value of x) is determined by the optimal rotational
weights w∗1 , w
∗
2 . When the weight just before the adjustment is above 1/2, x is
between 1 and the value that leads to w∗1 or w
∗
2 (depending on the proximity to
1/2). When the weight is below 1/2, x is between 0 and the value that leads
to w∗1 . The longer the remaining game duration, the more likely is x to try to
approach the optimal rotational values, but if the remaining game is short, a
binary value will be preferred. We can continue the previous example in order
to show how this approach works.
Example 5 In the second and third variant of Example 4 for w = 0.62, β = 0.8,
the adversary has chosen the penalty sequence (0.8469, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, . . .), which
forces the weights to converge to the optimal rotational weights w∗1 , w
∗
2 after
the third round. However, it was pointed out that a ten round game is not
long enough to justify the sacrifice necessary for the adjustment, since the
sequence (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0) produces a definitely superior result. This fact
indicates that perhaps there is an optimal sequence (x, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0), where
0.8469 ≤ x ≤ 1.
The first round loss without adjustment is equal to w × 1 + (1− w)× 0 =
w = 0.62. The first round loss with the aforementioned optimal rotational
adjustment x∗ = 0.8469 is wx∗ + (1 − w)(1 − x∗) = 0.5833. Therefore the
adversary’s sacrifice when x∗ is used is equal to 0.0367. On the other hand
the optimal rotational loss per round is w∗1 , while the loss per round (in the
second phase) in the greedy scenario is [f(2) + 1 − f(3)]/2. The difference
w∗1 − [f(2) + 1− f(3)]/2 = 0.527864− 0.527832 = 0.000032 is so small that more
than one thousand rounds are needed to balance the sacrifice. Direct numerical
optimization of the total cumulative loss w.r.t. x (given by expression 19) for a
643 round long game gives a value of the optimal x equal to 0.8583, which shows
convergence towards x∗ = 0.8469 as T increases. 2
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0.8830 0.7273 0.8830 0.7273
0.8579 0.8686 1.7409 1.5960
0.8285 0.8410 2.5694 2.4369
0.7944 0.8088 3.3638 3.2458
0.7556 0.7719 4.1194 4.0177
0.7121 0.7303 4.8314 4.7480
0.6642 0.6842 5.4957 5.4322
0.6128 0.6341 6.1085 6.0663
0.5587 0.5810 6.6672 6.6472
0.5032 0.5259 7.1704 7.1731
greedy
loss in 
round n
adjusted
loss in
round n
greedy
cumulative
loss until 
round n
adjusted
cumulative
loss until 
round n
Table 3: Loss in each round of the game of Example 6.
6.4 A last micro-adjustment before entering rotation
Example 6 Let us re-examine the optimal penalties of the ten round game,
which are shown in Fig. 3. Five areas have been marked by using pairs of vertical
dotted lines. In all five areas we can observe a small non binary adjustment
in the first round penalty (`01). The rightmost area is around w = 0.88. More
precisely, assume that the initial (first option) weight is w01 = w = 0.883. Then,
ten rounds are not enough to bring the weight under 1/2; in fact a ten round
penalty vector (1, 1, . . . , 1) leaves the final (tenth) round weight at w91 = 0.5032.
Therefore, a somewhat careless reading of Lemma 3 would lead to the conclusion
that the all one penalty vector is optimal.
However, a closer inspection of Fig. 3 reveals that the optimal penalty of
the first round is a little bit smaller than 1, the exact value being equal to
0.7968. Indeed, the total cumulative loss for the penalty vector (0.7968, 1, . . . , 1)
is 7.1731, while for (1, 1, . . . , 1) it is 7.1704. (The optimal total loss appears in
Fig. 2). Actually, Lemma 3 is not applicable in this instance of the problem,
since it requires the weight of an “eleventh” round to stay above 1/2, which is
not true (since w101 = wβ
10/(wβ10 + 1− w) = 0.4476).
An explanation of what has happened can be found in Table 3. The loss
in each round under the greedy policy is given in the first column, and the
cumulative loss is given in the third column. The loss under the adjusted penalty
vector is given in the third column, together with the cumulative loss in the
last column. The adjustment in the first round creates a reduced loss, equal to
0.7273, as compared to the maximum possible loss in this round, which equals
0.8830. This initial sacrifice creates an opportunity for increased losses in the
next nine rounds, as seen by comparing the first two columns. However, the
total loss of the adjusted policy compensates the initial sacrifice for the first
time in the last round. An earlier compensation is not possible, since it would
violate Lemma 3. Indeed Lemma 3 is still valid for a nine round game, since
w91 = 0.5032 > 1/2, and this guarantees the superiority of the greedy (binary)
policy until the ninth round. 2
Let us explore somewhat further the above results. Lemma 3 determines the
optimal policy for game instances with initial weight w in the interval
[
1
1+βT
, 1
]
,
while Lemma 4 determines game instances such that w ∈
[
1
1+βT−1 ,
1
1+βT
)
. Both
sets of instances are such that a greedy adversary cannot reverse the balance of
weights between options, i.e. the second option weight can never climb above the
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Figure 6: Optimal initial round first option penalty `01 vs initial weight w in the
critical interval
[
1
1+βT−1 ,
1
1+βT
)
= [0.882, 0.903) (for β = 0.8).
first option weight under any policy, and all first option weights in all rounds, i.e.
weights w01, w
1
1, . . . , w
T−1
1 are always greater than 1/2. However, in the games of
Lemma 4 the “residual” weight after the end of the game, i.e. the weight wT1
that would enter a (non-existing) T + 1’th round, falls below 1/2 and below wT2
under the greedy policy. In Fig. 6 we use the game instance of the previous
example and show the optimal first round penalty as a function of w in the
critical interval
[
1
1+βT−1 ,
1
1+βT
)
. Fig. 6 could be seen as a magnification of part
of Fig. 3. However, in Fig. 6 we can clearly see that `01 is greedy in the rightmost
part of this interval, while in the leftmost part it grows from around 3/4 to 1 in
a manner which seems to be linear. These results say, among other things, that
the area of validity of Lemma 3 should be extended beyond 1/(1 + βT ) towards
smaller w values.
Given the analysis of the previous paragraph, Lemmas 3 and 4 could be
combined in a stronger lemma that would state that the left side of (17), i.e.
Fn() ≡ (1− )f(0) +  [1− f(0)] +
n∑
k=1
f(k − 2 ) (20)
is maximized for  = 0, if w > wf , where wf is a value in the interval[
1
1+βT−1 ,
1
1+βT
)
. Taking into account that
f(k − 2) = wβ
k−2
1− w + wβk−2
and also taking into account certain properties of the q-digamma function, F ()
can be expressed as
Fn() = (1−)w+ [1−w]+
ψβ
(
1− ln
w−1
wβ−2
ln β
)
lnβ
+
ψβ
(
1 + n− ln
w−1
wβ−2
ln β
)
lnβ
(21)
where ψq(z) is the q-digamma function, i.e. ψq(z) = Γ
′
q(z)/Γq(z) and Γq(z) is
the q-Gamma function [Ask78, KMS10].
6.5 Inside the phase of rotation
While we shall see that all optimization related adjustments must be realized
before entering rotation, their justification stems from the behavior of Hedge in
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the rotation phase. Given a sufficient number of rounds, and an initial weight
outside the rotation area, at some round t0 the current (first option) weight
wt0−11 = w will enter the intersection area. Also, a game may start with a weight
w01 = w inside the intersection area. In both scenarios the future of the game
is in the phase of rotation. In the second scenario there will be no transitional
phase, nevertheless the adversary will try to optimize the rest of the game. In
the first scenario, the current weight w is probably an outcome of previous
optimization, which has been implemented in the transitional phase, i.e. in the
first t0 rounds (t ∈ [0, t0 − 1]). Thus one would expect that in this scenario w
is already optimized in view of some pre-determined (also optimal) transition
phase policy. Of course it wouldn’t hurt to try to optimize the rest of the game,
but the expected outcome should be the same as in the originally optimized
plan. With these thoughts in mind we take a weight w in the intersection area
as our starting point and try to optimize the adversary’s policy for the rest of
the game.
Once in the intersection area the adversary has the opportunity to imple-
ment the greedy penalty policy (`t01 , `
t0+1
1 , . . .) = (1, 0, 1, 0, . . .), which (assum-
ing w > 1/2) will create a sequence of alternating weights (w,wβ/(wβ + 1 −
w), w, wβ/(wβ + 1 − w), w, . . .). It will also create a loss equal to w + (1 −
w)/(wβ + 1 − w) in each pair of rounds. The advantage of this policy is that
the adversary creates a loss greater than 1/2 in every round. In addition, we
have seen in section 4.2 that the loss in each pair of rounds is optimized if
w = w∗1 = 1/(1 +
√
β). In some games the adversary will have already controlled
the transitional phase (if such a phase exists) so as to achieve the optimal weight
at the time of entering the intersection area, i.e. wt0−11 = w
∗
1 . In some other
games the sacrifice necessary in the transitional phase in order to reach w∗1
cannot be justified by the gains in the last part of the game, and the adversary
opts for an entry weight other than w∗1 . Anyway, if w
t0−1
1 6= w∗1 , the adversary
cannot move from wt0−11 = w to w
∗
1 at zero cost. An exception occurs if w is
exactly equal to 1/2, since under this assumption any adjustment can be achieved
immediately at zero cost. We take up this particular, but very interesting, case
in section 7.
We now summarize the basic thesis for the rotational phase: By stepwise
using lemmas 6 and 7 it can be shown that any multiple step (i.e. round) scenario,
which starts with a weight w inside the intersection area, can be optimized to a
scenario that has only one adjustment step in one of the first two rounds or no
adjustment at all, depending on the remaining number of rounds, which should
be able to absorb the adjustment cost. If an adjustment can be justified, it will
take place in the first or the second round (of the remaining game), depending
on the relative positioning between between w and the target weight, as shown
in the aforementioned lemmas.
Effectively, if w01 = w is already in the intersection area, the adversary
will use a penalty vector of the form (1− x, 0, 1, 0, . . .) or (1, x, 1, 0, . . .). Since
the remaining total cumulative loss is a function of one variable, even direct
optimization w.r.t. x is possible. If there is room for the transitional phase, i.e. if
wβT > 1−w, the adversary would first opt for a penalty of the form (1, 1, . . . , 1)
until the weight enters the intersection area. Upon entering this area a non binary
penalty adjustment would be needed, in the first or second round. However, any
adjustments are “pulled” towards the beginning or the game. Therefore a general
game will start with penalties (1, x, 1, . . .) or (1− x, 1, 1, . . .) and continue with
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“1”s until the weight enters the intersection area, whereupon it will continue with
alternating binary penalties. The optimum x can be calculated even by using
direct optimization, since there are only two candidate functions to optimize.
Consequences of the above are (a) that all penalties beyond the second round
are binary, and (b) that the problem is solvable in polynomial time.
Another consequence is that it is now possible to estimate the distance
between the optimum solution and the greedy one.
6.6 Estimation of error induced by using binary penalties
Category I: Games that include a clear transitional phase only If
wβT > 1−w, the greedy policy is the optimal, and the “error” of using a greedy
solution is zero.
Category II: Games that include a transitional phase that “touches”
the intersection area There is this somewhat “singular” case, in which
wβT ≤ 1 − w < wβT−1, i.e. the assumptions of Lemma 4 are true. If the
adversary adopts a greedy policy, the last round still starts with a weight above
1/2, but in an additional round (although an additional round does not exist)
the weight would fall below 1/2. We have seen that in such an instance of the
problem a small initial sacrifice will optimize the total cumulative loss, by using
a first round penalty equal to 1− . In mathematical terms this means that the
maximum total cumulative loss can be expressed as max L(), where
L() = w(1− ) + (1− w)+
T−1∑
i=1
wβi−
wβi− + (1− w)β .
Taking into account that the greedy policy loss is L(0), we can calculate the
“binary penalty error” as the difference
max

L()− L(0),
but we shall give a simple upper bound to this error. For w > 1/2 and 0 <  < 1
the inequality w(1− ) + (1− w) < w is true, therefore
L()− L(0) <
T−1∑
i=1
wβi−
wβi− + (1− w)β −
T−1∑
i=1
wβi
wβi + 1− w.
Note also that the summation terms grow as  moves from 0 towards 1. If we
accept the conjecture that the value of  that maximizes L() is in [0, 1/4], we
can use  = 1/4 in the summation and obtain the following upper bound:
L()− L(0) <
T−1∑
i=1
wβi−1/4
wβi−1/4 + (1− w)β1/4 −
T−1∑
i=1
wβi
wβi + 1− w
This inequality holds for any  ∈ [0, 1/4], thus it also holds for the  that
maximizes the total loss.
However, it is possible to obtain a looser, but much easier to calculate, upper
bound by letting  = 1/2. This value of  will further improve the summation,
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therefore
L() < w +
T−1∑
i=1
wβi−1/2
wβi−1/2 + (1− w)β1/2
= w +
T−1∑
i=1
wβi−1
wβi−1 + (1− w)
= w +
T−2∑
i=0
wβi
wβi + (1− w)
= w + L(0)− wβ
T−1
wβT−1 + 1− w
and since the last round weight is still above 1/2 the following inequalities are
also valid:
L()− L(0) < w − wβ
T−1
wβT−1 + 1− w < w −
1
2
< 1/2 (22)
Effectively, the new simplified, albeit very loose, bound is just 1/2, and one
interpretation of this result is that the error cannot me more than the loss of
any single round (since in any round the loss is ≥ 1/2). The true error is usually
smaller by a few orders of magnitude. In Example 7 we present a 10 round game
with β = 0.8 and initial weight w = 0.883. The maximum total loss is equal
to 7.1731 and occurs for 1 −  = 0.7968, while the greedy policy gives 7.1704,
therefore the error due to binary penalties is 0.0027.
Category III: Games that include rotation The greedy policy eventually
pushes the weights into the intersection area. If the w′ is the (first option)
weight that appears for the first time in the intersection area (and always
assuming that w > 1/2), then the (first option weight) oscillates between w′ and
w′β/(w′β + 1− w′), thereby producing a loss equal to
L′ = w′ + 1− w
′β
w′β + 1− w′
for each successive couple of rounds until the end of the game. L′ is maximized
by the the ideal rotational weights of section 4.2, the maximum being equal
to Lp = 2/(1 +
√
β). The exact value of the intersection area entry weight w′
is “random”, as it totally depends on the initlal weight w01 = w (and β). On
the other hand L′ is minimized for w′ = 1/(1 + β) or w′ = 1/2, which are also
“mirror” values under rotation (i.e. 1/(1+β) with a first option penalty equal to 1
produces a weight equal to 1/2 in the following round, and 1/2 with a penalty
equal to 0 produces 1/(1 + β) in the following round). Both w′ = 1/(1 + β)
and w′ = 1/2 give the minimum L′ as equal to 1/2 + 1/(1 + β) Therefore the
distance between the maximum and the minimum value of L′ is
∆L′(β) =
2
1 +
√
β
− 1
2
− 1
1 + β
≥ 0
which expresses the maximum error in loss due to binary penalties per couple
of rounds. Note that ∆L′(0) = 1/2, ∆L′(1) = 0, and 0 ≤ ∆L′(β) ≤ 1/2. Fig. 7
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Figure 7: ∆L′(β)/2, i.e. maximum error per round due to binary policy, vs β.
gives the average error per round ∆L′(β)/2 vs β. Although for β close to zero
the per round error can be as high as 1/4, for β greater then 1/2 it falls rapidly
below 1/1000, and for β = 0.8 the error is smaller than 10−4.
Let us summarize our findings. Assuming a game such that wβT < 1− w,
i.e. a game such that there exists at least one round in the intersection area, the
game in the first T1 rounds falls in the previous Category II, where
wβT1 ≤ 1− w < wβT1−1 ⇔ T1 =
⌈
ln(1− w)− lnw
lnβ
⌉
(23)
As we have already seen, in Category II games the optimal policy for the
adversary is either simply binary, or there is a small adjustment in the first or
the second round, and for the error one can use any of the upper bounds given
by (22). In fact these bounds have been calculated for a game of duration T1
exactly. However, here we are exploring a longer game of T > T1 rounds, which
means that the total cumulative loss for the T round game may be suboptimal
w.r.t. to a T1 round game, since in the T round game the adversary has to cater
for the remaining T − T1 rounds as well. Effectively, the bounds given by (22)
remain valid for the T round game, but one could try to find a tighter bound.
Since the next T − T1 rounds are rotational rounds with an error upper
bounded by ∆L′(β) in each pair of rounds, the total error in the last T − T1
rounds is bounded by ⌈
T − T1
2
⌉
∆L′(β) (24)
This expression actually contains the error of an additional (non existing) round
if the rotation contains an even number of rounds.
Finally, the total error can be calculated as the sum of the bound of the
transitional phase (22) for the first T1 rounds (where T1 is given by 23), and the
bound of the rotational phase given by (24).
Practically speaking, the transitional phase error does rarely exceed the order
of magnitude of 10−3, and the per round error in the rotational phase is usually
below 10−4 for reasonably valued β. Therefore, the total error of the binary
policy will accumulate to a figure that is comparable to the loss of a single round
only in really long games with thousands of rounds in the rotational phase.
7 The special case of equal initial weights
The natural choice for a player that is not in possession of additional or internal
information is to start the game with equal initial weights, i.e. w = w1 =
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w2 = 1/2 (if N = 2). Moreover, we have seen in all results that have so far
been presented that the maximum loss achievable by an intelligent adversary is
minimized for w = 1/2. Therefore it is in the players best interest to start with
w = 1/2.
On the other hand games that start with equal weights are easier to analyze:
The sacrifice that is often necessary for optimally entering rotation comes “for
free” if the weights are equal, and, fortunately, this fact contributes to a closed
form solution, as we shall show in this section. In [AL15] we have given a short
duration game example (T = 3) in which the initial weights are (1/2, 1/2). The
overall maximization of the total loss has produced a pair of penalties (3/4, 1/4)
for the first round and the pairs (0, 1), (1, 0) for the remaining two rounds. This
is a remarkable result in the light of the analysis of this section, since in just
one round the adversary “converts” the initial weights (1/2, 1/2) to the ideal
pair of weights (given by (15) in section 4.2) and is able to use them in the next
two rounds. In this particular example the initial “adjustment” is made possible
without any sacrifice for the adversary, since any pair of penalties (`, 1 − `)
produce a constant first round loss (equal to 12 × `+ 12 (1− `) = 12 ) for any `.
Moreover, Example 1 provides a strong hint for the analysis of instances
of Problem 1 that start with equal weights and extend their duration for an
arbitrary number of rounds T . For N = 2 the obviously suggested solution is
that the adversary should use the penalty sequence
(`01, `
1
1, `
2
1, ..., `
T−1
1 ) =
(
3
4
, 0, 1, 0, 1, . . .
)
or the sequence
(`01, `
1
1, `
2
1, ..., `
T−1
1 ) =
(
1
4
, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . .
)
Both schemes will produce a total loss equal to 1/2 +T − 1/(1 +√β), which can
be seen as a lower bound of the total cumulative loss for equal initial weights,
i.e.
LT−1max
(
1
2
)
≥ 1
2
+
T − 1
1 +
√
β
, (25)
but we already know that this is the correct maximum loss for a three round
game, i.e. L2max(1/2) = 1/2 + 2/(1 +
√
β). Therefore, a reasonable conjecture
to be explored is whether the equality would still be valid for any T , since the
weight adjustment is in accordance with Lemma 5, as it takes place in the very
first round. Numerical tests based on the methodology of section 3.1 reveal that
(25) holds as an equality for odd values of T , but it is a strict inequality for even
values. Let us see why.
Suppose that the adversary uses the penalty sequence (`01, `
1
1, `
2
1, ..., `
T−1
1 ) =
(x, 0, 1, 0, 1, . . .). Since the initial weights are the initial weights (w01, w
0
2) =
(1/2, 1/2), the weights in the second round are
w11 =
βx
βx + β1−x
, w12 =
β1−x
βx + β1−x
and the weights in the third round are
w21 =
βx
βx + β2−x
, w22 =
β2−x
βx + β2−x
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Figure 8: Optimal first round penalty x∗ vs T , for β = 0.6.
The total loss in both the second and third round (i.e. the cumulative loss in
one cycle) is
Lc = `
1
1w
1
1 + `
1
2w
1
2 + `
2
1w
2
1 + `
2
2w
2
2 = w
1
2 + w
2
1 =
β1−x
βx + β1−x
+
βx
βx + β2−x
If T = 2k + 1, the total cumulative loss achieved by using the aforementioned
penalty scheme is
Lp =
1
2
+ kw12 + kw
2
1 =
1
2
+ k
β1−x
βx + β1−x
+ k
βx
βx + β2−x
,
which is maximized for x = 3/4 as seen before. This value of x produces equal
terms w12 and w
2
1. If, however, T = 2k, then
Lp =
1
2
+ kw12 + (k − 1)w21 =
1
2
+ k
β1−x
βx + β1−x
+ (k − 1) β
x
βx + β2−x
,
since the last cycle is not complete. In the latter case the adversary can take
advantage of the fact that the term w12 appears more times than the term w
2
1 and
increase the first term at the expense of the second by using a value of x higher
than 3/4. The smaller the number of rounds T , the more will the adversary try
to increase w12 w.r.t. w
2
1, but of course x cannot exceed 1.
The above two expressions can be unified in the following expression that is
valid for both odd and even values of T :
Lp =
1
2
+
⌈
T − 1
2
⌉
β1−x
βx + β1−x
+
⌊
T − 1
2
⌋
βx
βx + β2−x
(26)
In Fig. 8 we present a graph of the optimal first round penalty x∗ (that maximizes
the total cumulative loss Lp of formula (26)) vs T for β = 0.6. The figure shows
that for games with even T no adjustment is necessary in the initial round if
T ≤ 32; thus the adversary can adopt a totally binary (and greedy) policy. If T
is still even, but greater than 32, x∗ becomes fractional and tends asymptotically
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Figure 9: Optimal first round penalty x∗ vs k = T/2, for β = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9.
to the optimal value for games with an odd number of rounds, i.e. to 3/4. Of
course, if T is odd, then x∗ is always equal to 3/4.
Clearly, if T is odd, the adversary will be able to maximize the player’s loss by
using penalties (3/4, 1/4) (or vice versa) in the first round, as this action would
immediately generate the optimal pair of weights given by (15). In the next T −1
rounds the greedy (binary) policy is optimal. If T is even, x∗ is between 3/4
and 1. An adversary who is ignorant of this kind of fine tuning and uses a greedy
policy (with perhaps a random choice in the first round, since the initial weights
are equal), will behave suboptimally in both cases. In the first case (when T
is odd), there will be a constant loss in each round. In the second case (when
T is even), the required adjustment is smaller, therefore the lack of adjustment
implies a less pronounced suboptimality, and under certain conditions (β large
enough, T small enough) x∗ = 1, i.e. there is no suboptimality at all. A different
kind of “ignorance” is involved if the adversary uses the rotationally optimal
pair (by always setting x∗ = 3/4) without taking into account the parity of T .
Then the relative error is more pronounced in shorter games than in longer ones.
However, in most of these situations the suboptimality is practically insignificant.
For example, if β = 0.7, the relative error is less than 1% in each round.
In conclusion, the expression 25 for the total cumulative loss of two option
games that start with equal weights can now be replaced by the more accurate
expression
LT−1max
(
1
2
)
=
1
2
+
⌈
T − 1
2
⌉
β1−x
∗
βx∗ + β1−x∗
+
⌊
T − 1
2
⌋
βx
∗
βx∗ + β2−x∗
, (27)
However, for odd valued T we have seen that x∗ = 3/4, and (27) simplifies to
LT−1max
(
1
2
)
=
1
2
+
T − 1
1 +
√
β
, (28)
Also, for T = 2k it is possible to achieve a closed form solution for x∗. The first
step towards the evaluation of x∗ is to replace bx by a new variable, say y, in
(26). Then by setting ∂Lp/∂y = 0, choosing the right (positive) root (out of five
possible roots), going back to x, and accepting a value up to 1, one will obtain
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the following result:
x∗ = min
1, ln
(
−β
2−
√
(β−1)2β3k(k−1)
β+k−βk
)
lnβ
 (29)
There is also a symmetric solution with the same total loss obtained by using
the reverse penalties (1− x∗, 1, 0, 1, 0, . . .). Expressions (27), (28), and (29) give
a complete closed form solution for the significant category of games that start
with equal weights between options.
8 Further examples
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the optimal behavior of the adversary is to
revisit the sample problem that has already been solved by using the recursive
methodology of section 3.1.
Example 7 We revisit Example 3 in the light of the previous analysis. We can
easily calculate the number of rounds, in which Lemma 3 remains valid, i.e. the
current (first option) weight remains above 1/2 and cannot fall below 1/2 in one
more round. Assuming that the game is long enough, the length of this phase
(measured in rounds) is equal to t1, where t1 is such that
wβt1+1 ≥ 1− w ⇔ t1 ≤
ln
(
1−w
w
)
lnβ
− 1,
and
wβt1+2 < 1− w ⇔ t1 >
ln
(
1−w
w
)
lnβ
− 2,
If the game is not long enough, i.e. of T < t1, then of course the duration of this
first phase will be equal to T . There will be no first phase at all if the starting
weight w is too close to 1/2. Therefore the first phase duration T1 is given by
T1 = max
{
min
{⌊
ln
(
1−w
w
)
lnβ
− 1
⌋
, T
}
, 0
}
(30)
A plot of T1 vs w is shown in Fig. 10 for the purpose of comparison with the
penalties of Fig. 3. For w > 0.92 Lemma 3 is valid, there is no second phase at
all, and the adversary can fully adopt the greedy approach, i.e. ten successive
unitary penalties for option 1.
As w decreases, at w around 0.9 we reach an area, which according to Fig. ??
makes the adversary choose a non binary first round penalty. For example,
consider the weight w = 0.883. Then the assumptions of Lemma 4 become true
and the greedy penalty vector
(`01 . . . `
9
1) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1),
which produces a total cumulative loss equal to 7.1704, is no longer optimal.
Nevertheless, the weight in the final round is equal to w91 = 0.5032, i.e. still
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Figure 10: First phase duration T1 vs initial weight w (for w > 1/2 and β = 0.8).
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Figure 11: Total cumulative loss if a non binary adjustment is optimally executed
in the n’th round (n = 1, 2, . . . , 10).
above 1/2, therefore a greedy adversary would still choose p91 = 1, which is
possibly suboptimal.
In order to make use of Lemma 4 let us set `01 = 1 −  and w01 = w. Then
the total loss to be maximized w.r.t.  is equal to
(1− )w + (1− w) +
T−2∑
i=0
wβ1−+i
wβ1−+i + (1− w)β
Direct optimization w.r.t.  (for w = 0.883) gives the optimal penalty vector as
(`01 . . . `
9
1) = (0.7968, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), (31)
which results in a total loss equal to 7.1731.
According to Lemma 4 any necessary adjustments should be undertaken as
soon as possible. Fig. 11 shows the effect of pushing the adjustment beyond the
initial round on the total cumulative loss.
Further examination of Fig. 3 shows that for w = 0.556 there is one more
non binary adjustment in the first round, but in the neighboring w = 0.555
the adjustment moves into the second round; this calls for an explanation.
It seems that there is a kind of micro-management at this point. If T were
very large, the adversary would try to approach the optimal rotation weights
(1/(1 +
√
β),
√
β/(1 +
√
β) as soon as possible. Since w > 1/2, the adversary
would take an adjustment step from w to 1/(1 +
√
β) (because
√
β/(1 +
√
β) is
not reachable in one step).
Finally, we give a graph of the total cumulative loss vs w for T = 1, 2, . . . , 10
in Fig 12. The top curve is the same as in Fig. 2. Note, however, that the
penalties for each curve must be calculated separately. In other words, the
penalties that create the loss of the ninth curve are not the first nine penalties
of Fig. 3. 2
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Figure 12: Total cumulative loss vs w for T = 1, 2, . . . , 10, and for β = 0.8.
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Figure 13: Total cumulative loss after T = 10 rounds vs initial (first option)
weight w (for β = 0.1).
The ten round game of Example 3 is balanced in the sense that the Hedge
adaptation factor β is not excessively strong and each phase consists of several
rounds if w is not very close to the values 0, 1/2, 1. In the next example we
explore games with an exceptionally strong β factor.
Example 8 We set β = 0.1 and T = 10 rounds again. The quantization of
w is as before. The resulting total cumulative loss vs w is shown on Fig. 13,
while Fig. 14 shows the associated penalties. In order for the first phase to last
even for one round a value w that satisfies wβ > 1− w is needed, which gives
w > 1/(1 + β) = 10/11 ' 0.9091. 2
Assume that a game is long enough, so as to enable the adversary to reach
rotation, i.e. T is such that wβT < 1− w. Let T0 be the minimum number of
rounds that enables the adversary to enforce rotation by using greedy binary
penalties, i.e. T0 is such that wβ
T0 < 1−w. Effectively, the adversary can force
Hedge to enter rotation after T0 rounds for the rest of the game, i.e. for the next
T − T0 rounds, by setting(
`T0 , `T0+1, . . . , `T−1
)
= (0, 1, . . .)
This sequence creates a rotation that involves cycles consististing of two rounds
each with the pair of weights(
wβT0
wβT0 + 1− w,
1− w
wβT0 + 1− w
)
(32)
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Figure 14: Round i first option penalty `i1 (i = 0, 1, . . . , 9) vs initial (first option)
weight w (for β = 0.1).
in the first round and the pair(
wβT0−1
wβT0−1 + 1− w,
1− w
wβT0−1 + 1− w
)
(33)
in the second round. This scheme produces a loss per cycle equal to
Lc =
1− w
wβT0 + 1− w +
wβT0−1
wβT0−1 + 1− w (34)
According to the analysis of section 4.2, in this period the adversary could
have achieved a per cycle loss equal to 2/(1 +
√
β), which is greater than Lc of
formula 34. However, the migration from weights 32 and 33 to the “ideal” pair(
1/(1 +
√
β),
√
β/(1 +
√
β)
)
(or vice versa) requires the aforementioned sacrifice,
which involves less profitable fractional penalties in the transition step. If the
remaining number of rounds T − T0 is small, the gains after the transition may
not justify the cost of the transition.
9 The optimal adversarial algorithm
In this final section we summarize the methodology that should be used by the
adversary. However, let us first remind that the quick and dirty solution, which is
subject to a very small error as explained in section 6.6, is the (straightforward)
greedy policy. A second observation is that the optimal policy that has been
analyzed in this paper is clearly of polynomial complexity. Also, the optimal
policy is not only non greedy, but any necessary adjustments, which in some
sense may depend on how the game ends, are reflected in measures that must
be taken in the beginning of the game. For example, the addition of one more
round to a game may convert a greedy optimal policy to a non greedy optimal
policy with an adjustment in the very first round.
First, assume that an instance of a game is given with specific values for the
number of rounds T , the adjustment parameter β, and the the initial weights
(w01, w
0
2) = (w, 1− w). Assume also that without loss of generality w ≥ 1/2. If
w = 1/2 the approach of the adversary is as described in section 7. Therefore,
in the following we assume that w > 1/2.
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We give now a sketch of the main ideas that exist behind the algorithm that
optimizes the adversary’s behavior in a two option game against a player that
uses Hedge. Let us use the greedy solution as a starting point. The greedy
adversary would constantly penalize the first option until at some round the
current (first option) weight falls below 1/2. Then a sequence of alternating
zeros and ones (0, 1, 0, 1, . . .) is used until the end of the game. Effectively the
rotating weights that appear in the second phase depend on the initial weight w.
The non greedy adversary follows the same basic approach, albeit with certain
improvements:
A If the game is not long enough so as to make it into the rotation phase,
the optimal policy is greedy.
B If the game marginally misses the rotation phase, as described previously,
an adjustment in the initial step may by beneficial for the adversary.
C If the game is long enough so as to include a rotation phase, the adversary
may try to approach the ideal rotating weights, even partially, by using a
single non binary penalty somewhere in the game.
D If the number of rounds in the rotation phase is odd, one of the two rotating
weights appears once more than the other weight, and this should be taken
into account in determining the target rotating weights.
E Any non binary adjustment that aims at improving the rotating weights
should be undertaken as early as possible, i.e. at the beginning of rotation
or earlier. Effectively the rotating weights remain the same for the duration
of the rotational phase.
F The adjustment is done either by decreasing a penalty equal to 1 or by
increasing a penalty equal to 0, depending on which choice involves a
smaller sacrifice. If the adjustment involves decreasing an 1, it is should
better be done in the beginning of the game. If the adjustment involves
increasing a 0, it effectively appears as a correction to the first zero, which
cannot appear before the beginning of the rotation phase.
G A small adjustment in the first round may occasionally also improve the
performance of the transitional phase, but the final decision on this first
penalty depends on the existence of a rotating phase, and the target
rotating weights.
Effectively there is a limited number of optimal penalty patterns for the
adversary as follows:
1. If w, β and T are such that wβT > 1− w, the optimal penalty scheme is
greedy, i.e. (
`01, `
1
1, . . . `
T−1
1
)
= (1, 1, . . . , 1)
2. If wβT−1 ≥ 1 − w, and wβT < 1 − w, i.e. w ∈
[
1
1+βT−1 ,
1
1+βT
)
, the
adversary can try (
`01, `
1
1, . . . `
T−1
1
)
= (1− δ, 1, . . . , 1),
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where 0 ≤ δ < 1, and optimize the total cumulative weight as a single
variable function of δ. The result of this optimization is usually a very small
δ or exactly zero. A more detailed analysis shows that δ is an increasing
function of w in the interval
[
1
1+βT−1 ,
1
1+βT
)
, and remains equal to 1 for
w > w′, where w′ is a value inside this interval.
3. If wβT−1 < 1/2, the adversary calculates the length of the transition phase
T1 by using (30) and sets either
a (
`01, `
1
1, . . . `
T−1
1
)
= (1− δ, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
, 0, 1, 0, 1, . . .)
if the first weight that would appears in the intersection area under a
greedy scheme would be below the ideal weight and above 1/2, or
b (
`01, `
1
1, . . . `
T−1
1
)
= (1, 1, 1, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
, δ, 1, 0, 1, . . .)
if the first weight that would appears in the intersection area under a
greedy scheme would be above the ideal weight.
In both cases the adversary can optimize a single valued function (of δ),
but we have already seen in previous sections that the outcome depends
on (a) the number of the remaining rounds in the rotational phase, i.e.
T − T1, and also on whether (b) T − T1 is odd or even. The adjustment
towards the ideal weights is more pronounced as T − T1 increases, but an
odd number of remaining rounds puts more emphasis on one of the options,
thus discouraging the adjustment to the ideal weights. If the rotational
phase is not long enough, the optimal adjustment may be partial, and
the rotating weights assume values that lie between the greedy rotational
weights and the ideal ones, as observed in the examples.
A somewhat singular situation that might raise concerns of not falling into
the above typology of penalties is the following: What if the game in the first
T1 rounds is as in 2, which calls for a possible adjustment in round 1, but it
then approaches the ideal weights as in 3b. If the assumptions of 3b are valid,
the first weight in the intersection area, say w′, is smaller than 1/(1 + β) (so
as to be in the intersection area), and greater than 1/(1 +
√
β) (so as to better
approach the ideal weights from below). The more w′ approaches 1/(1 + β), the
more unlikely is the adjustment δ of type 2 to be non zero.
A final note on the optimization of loss functions, which result from the above
penalty patterns: All these loss functions are sums of terms of the form f(k) or
f(k − 2δ). For example, penalties as in pattern No. 2, i.e. (`01, `11, . . . `T−11 ) =
(1−δ, 1, . . . , 1), end up with a loss equal to FT−1(δ), where function F is given by
(20), and can be expressed in terms of the q-Gamma and q-digamma functions as
in (21). Even so, these functions are no more than a sum of terms of of the form
f(k) or f(k−2δ), as already mentioned. Pattern 3a is slightly more complicated,
but it essentially remains of the same form.
To the best of our knowledge there is no closed form solution for the opti-
mization of the objective functions that result from patterns 2 and 3a. On the
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other hand, they are single valued functions, which can easily be maximized by
using any non-linear maximization approach, which clearly is out of the scope of
this paper.
On the contrary, there is a closed form (albeit very complex) solution for
Pattern 3b. Firstly, this pattern can be simplified by calculating the rotation
phase entry weight that results after T1 greedy rounds, and using it as a starting
weight for the rest of the calculation, which aims at optimizing the rotation
phase only. Furthermore, due to the periodicity the resulting objective function
contains only three f terms, since all odd valued round losses are equal and all
even valued round losses are also equal. If T − T1 is odd, the objective function
is
g(δ) ≡ w1δ+(1−w1)(1−δ)+ T − T1
2
(
w1
w1 + (1− w1)β1−2δ +
w1β
2δ
w1β2δ + 1− w1
)
where w1 is the weight after the first T1 greedy rounds. There is a similar
expression for even T − T1. It is possible to maximize g(δ) by solving g′(δ) = 0.
Since g′(δ) is a function of β2δ only, we can set x = β2δ and then solve the
equation for x. The solution consists of four roots (with very long expressions)
w.r.t. x, and thus a closed form solution can be found.
10 Conclusions
We have presented various aspects of the solution to the problem of finding the
worst performance of the Hedge algorithm. We have shown that despite initial
appearances, which point towards NP-completeness, the optimal strategy for
the adversary remains almost greedy and binary. However, optimality often
requires additional small non greedy adjustments, which depend on both the
initial conditions and the long run of the game.
In short, the optimal adversarial strategy against Hedge consists of two
discrete phases, if the game is long enough (so as to be able to accommodate
both phases), and if the initial weight distribution is not uniform. These phases
are: (a) An almost greedy strategy that penalizes the maximum weight in each
round, and ends up with an almost uniform weight distribution, and (b) a
rotational behavior that penalizes each option periodically.
The non greedy adjustments aim (i) at properly entering the rotational
phase and (ii) at optimizing the performance of each cycle during rotation. The
adjustments depend on the initial weight distribution and on the length of the
game. A longer game is more likely to favor an adjustment. Interestingly, they
also depend on the parity of the game length. However, adjustments are isolated
abrupt (i.e. not gradual) events, as they take place in very few specific rounds
of the game (if at all), i.e. at the beginning of the game or at the beginning of
the second phase.
Our analysis also shows that from a practical viewpoint the adversary can
simply use the greedy strategy (of always maximally penalizing the currently
maximum weight), and we provide margins of the adversary’s performance loss
w.r.t. the optimal strategy. However, in very long games the sub-optimality
costs accumulate in each round.
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i=1 wi
= wN
Table 4: Hedge behaviour in the first N + 1 rounds for a rotating loss scheme.
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A Appendix
Example 9 Assume that the adversary uses an alternating loss scheme as
follows
`0 = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
`1 = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
`2 = (0, 0, 1, . . . , 0)
. . .
`N−1 = (0, 0, 0, . . . , 1)
`N = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
`N+1 = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
. . .
The subsequent behavior of Hedge is shown on Table 4. In fact any permutation
of the first N vectors will produce the same result, but without loss of generality
we consider only the above scheme. The last column shows the single non-zero
element of the loss vector in each round. Apparently the scheme repeats itself
with a period (or cycle) of N rounds. The total loss per cycle (consisting of N
rounds) is constant and equal to
Lc(N, β,w1, . . . , wN )
= w1 +
w2
w1β +
∑N
i=2 wi
+
w3
β
∑2
i=1 wi +
∑N
i=3 wi
+ . . .+
wN
β
∑N−1
i=1 wi + wN
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If T = kN (where k is an integer), the total Hedge loss is
LH(β) =
T
N
Lc(N, β,w1, . . . , wN )
and a simple modified expression can be written for any other integer T .
On the other hand the following inequality holds for the cumulative loss per
cycle
1 ≤ Lc(N, β,w1, . . . , wN ) ≤ 1
β
(35)
which can be proved as follows: First, note that
w0j
β
∑j−1
i=1 wi +
∑N
i=j wi
≥ w0j (j = 2, 3, . . . , N)
therefore
Lc(N, β,w1, . . . , wN ) ≥
N∑
j=1
w0j = 1
Regarding the upper bound
w0j
β
∑j−1
i=1 wi +
∑N
i=j wi
≤ w
0
j
β
∑j−1
i=1 wi + β
∑N
i=j wi
=
1
β
w0j (j = 2, 3, . . . , N)
therefore
Lc(N, β,w1, . . . , wN ) ≤ 1
β
N∑
j=1
w0j =
1
β
This means that if T = kN the total loss is bounded as follows:
T
N
≤ LH(β) ≤ T
βN
(36)
In particular, for equal initial weights w1 = w2 = . . . = wN = 1/N the cycle
loss is simplified to
Lce(N, β) ≡ Lc(N, β, 1/N, . . . , 1/N) =
N−1∑
i=0
1
iβ +N − i (37)
Sample values of the per round average loss Lce(N, β)/N obtained by using this
formula are shown in Fig. 15. Apparently, the per round loss decreases with the
number of options, therefore if the adversary were allowed to choose the number
of options, her choice would be N = 2. For N = 2 options the cycle loss reduces
to
Lce(2, β) =
1
2
+
1
1 + β
while for arbitrary N it can be shown to be equal to
Lce(N, β) = −
ψ( N−1+β )− ψ(N + N−1+β )
−1 + β (38)
where ψ(z) = Γ
′(z)
Γ(z) is the digamma function. Sample values of Lc are shown on
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Figure 15: Per round loss Lce(N, β)/N vs. β calculated by (37) for N = 3, 6, 9.
Figure 16: Per cycle maximum loss Lc(0, N) and per step max. Lc(0, N)/N loss
vs. N .
Fig. 15. For β = 0 the cycle loss is apparently maximized, and
Lce(N, 0) =
N−1∑
i=0
1
iβ +N − i = γ + ψ(1 +N)
where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant (γ ≈ 0.577216). Note that the loss per
round is thus upper bounded by Lce(N, 0)/N , which is a decreasing function of
N . Fig. 16 shows both Lce(N, 0) and Lce(N, 0)/N . 2
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